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TWO DECADES OF CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 
SAMUEL W. BUELL* & BRANDON L. GARRETT** 
Twenty years after the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) first 
published guidelines for the criminal prosecution of corporations, in the fall of 
2019, we solicited the articles that follow in this Issue. Though American law on 
corporate criminal liability dates back to the nineteenth century, it was not until 
the end of the twentieth century that investigating and prosecuting corporations 
and their employees became a major and institutionalized feature of criminal 
justice in the United States, chiefly at the federal level. With that still relatively 
young practice concluding its second decade, and having produced a now vibrant 
and growing field of scholarship, a broader assessment is in order. 
What have we learned after two decades of organizational prosecutions in the 
United States, since the first publication of the Justice Department guidelines in 
a memo by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder?1 We have seen a string 
of updated prosecution guidelines, as each presidential Administration puts its 
stamp on an evolving approach towards prosecuting corporations, by adding to a 
now quite lengthy set of principles in the Justice Manual.2 We will no doubt see 
further revisions to those organizational prosecution guidelines in the years 
ahead. The government, the private bar, the bench, the academy, and the press 
continue to debate and refine the particulars of how to punish and deter crime 
within the large modern corporation. 
Meanwhile, we have seen no end to the cycles of severe corporate 
malfeasance. The breadth of corporate crimes and the scale of the offenses—
from small ten thousand-dollar schemes to defraud the federal government, to 
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 1.  See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and 
U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https:// 
perma.cc/J6RH-QVD3]. 
 2.  See Resources, CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-
prosecution-registry/browse/resources.html [https://perma.cc/KH3H-3MAD] (featuring links to DOJ 
documents related to federal corporate prosecution guidelines). Prior to 2018, the Justice Manual was 
known as the United States Attorney’s Manual. See Justice Manual, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual [https://perma.cc/3EUW-BS72]. Some articles in this issue, as 
well as cited sources, may refer to the United States Attorney’s Manual when speaking historically about 
this guidance. 
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multi-billion-dollar frauds that endanger entire economies—are a matter of 
major legal and political importance. The crimes in question range from bread-
and-butter wire fraud, to antitrust, to environmental crimes, to financial crimes, 
to kickbacks in pharmaceutical and other product manufacturing, to money 
laundering, and to foreign bribery. In short, we have seen “recurring corporate 
misconduct, from the accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom, to the BP oil 
spill, to the Volkswagen emissions scandal,” as James Nelson writes in this Issue.3 
This Issue, which we were honored to convene and contribute to, and for 
which we thank the Law and Contemporary Problems editors for their tireless 
editorial work in bringing to publication, addresses this new landscape twenty 
years on from the so-called Holder Memo. The articles that follow identify a 
number of questions that have arisen in the realm corporate criminal liability, 
present potential answers to those and other questions, and propose new areas 
for consideration over the next twenty years and beyond. 
One set of questions relates to the now mature American system of 
prosecuting corporations—and, most often, settling with them—as a means to 
reducing the prevalence of crime by employees. In Three Conceptions of 
Corporate Crime (and One Avenue for Reform),4 Miriam Baer assesses the 
growth of informal and out-of-court settlements in corporate cases. Baer focuses 
on the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), calling it “neither fish nor fowl.”5 
Such agreements are filed in court, so are not purely private settlements, but 
judicial review is highly deferential. The agreements include fines, but also 
compliance provisions, and some focus on cooperation in investigations of 
individuals. Baer notes: “Both the DPA itself and its underlying procedural 
framework have attracted pervasive criticism from commentators—for being too 
weak (mostly), too strong (sometimes), too arbitrarily applied, and far too 
lacking in transparency and follow-up. Despite these criticisms, this settlement 
format has flourished for roughly two or more decades.”6 The flexibility in these 
settlements and the compromises they represent, may explain their staying 
power. Baer argues, however, that “[t]here is at least one additional reason that 
DPAs and their close cousins have been able to outlast their critics, which is 
society’s collective inability to decide what corporate crime prosecution is 
supposed to accomplish.”7 Baer calls for legislation to reduce reliance on these 
largely extra-judicial compromises and to improve regulatory and judicial 
oversight. 
If there is ambivalence about the goals of corporate prosecutions, perhaps 
scholars can assist by further focus on underlying theory. One purpose of 
 
 3.  James D. Nelson, Some Realism About Corporate Crime, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 
2020, at 113, 113. 
 4.  Miriam H. Baer, Three Conceptions of Corporate Crime (and One Avenue for Reform), 83 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 1. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 2–3. 
 7.  Id. at 4. 
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corporate prosecutions could be to punish corporations, rather than use them as 
an instrument for crime control, as through compliance-type reforms. In Retiring 
Corporate Retribution,8 Samuel Buell takes one theory off the list of candidates: 
Buell explains how “corporations cannot be punished retributively,” and how 
discussion of corporate retribution still has not fully acknowledged the structural 
limitations to applying principles of individual criminal responsibility to business 
firms.9 As a result, “[t]here will always be a gap between what corporations 
deserve and what they receive.”10 This gap cannot be filled with a “punishment” 
directed at the firm itself. Thus, there are not only practical but also theoretical 
reasons to focus corporate prosecutions on how to effectively produce 
accountability in organizational settings. 
If the proper focus is on instrumental goals, though, there is much that the 
current settlement-oriented compliance approach neglects. In Testing 
Compliance,11 Brandon Garrett and Greg Mitchell describe how one key focus 
could be on cementing robust compliance, to ensure that corporations do not 
engage in repeat misconduct and are successfully reformed and rehabilitated. 
However, despite the stated goal of rewarding and requiring, at times, “effective” 
compliance by corporations, the effectiveness of such compliance efforts is not 
empirically validated. Indeed, enforcement approaches often discourage 
validation of compliance, which could result in self-critical information leading 
to further liability. Garrett and Mitchell conclude by explaining how an improved 
instrumental legal regime for corporate crime could incentivize testing of 
compliance and promulgate validated compliance methods. 
In The Government’s Prioritization of Information over Sanction: 
Implications for Compliance,12 Veronica Root Martinez describes the central 
importance of information sharing: the interest in promoting reporting and 
disclosure, rather than punishment or compliance. Martinez describes how a 
range of federal enforcers have adopted a model of enforcement that “prioritizes 
gathering information from firms over levying significant sanctions against 
them.”13 In corporate prosecution cases, the government: “(i) exerts pressure to 
incentivize firms to share information with the government, (ii) eschews 
sanctions in favor of oversight, and (iii) often sides with corporations in limiting 
the transparency of investigations into wrongdoing.”14 Martinez argues that if 
information gathering is the central goal of corporate liability, then enforcers 
should more clearly use sanctions to reward sound compliance and sharing of 
 
 8.  Samuel W. Buell, Retiring Corporate Retribution, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 
25. 
 9.  Id. at 26. 
 10.  Id. at 44. 
 11.  Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
4, 2020, at 47. 
 12.  Veronica Root Martinez, The Government’s Prioritization of Information over Sanction: 
Implications for Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 85. 
 13.  Id. at 99. 
 14.  Id. at 88. 
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information concerning compliance failures. The purposeful system of rewards 
that Martinez describes might be complimented by the approach towards 
prioritizing empirically validated reporting and testing of compliance as proposed 
by Garrett and Mitchell. 
In Some Realism About Corporate Crime,15 James Nelson addresses the 
problem of corporate crime at the broader level of whether the corporate form 
itself requires rethinking and redesign. He describes how realists about corporate 
rights have urged a pragmatic or legal realist approach that focuses on the 
“concrete facts and relations” that should guide the law’s treatment of 
corporations.16 Nelson sets out how “we ought to have a practical accounting of 
likely costs and benefits before we abandon core features of the corporate 
form.”17 Nelson concludes that we do not necessarily need to discard or reform 
the current corporate form, but rather should take advantage of its benefits for 
accountability. Nelson’s approach is consistent with each of those just described: 
a focus on the utilitarian case for corporate accountability, and a concrete focus 
on the empirical needs of an effective program of accountability. 
Mihailis Diamantis, in The Body Corporate,18 begins with the longstanding 
problem in corporate criminal liability of whether and how corporations can 
fulfill the mens rea elements of crimes. Diamantis then turns that discussion to 
the question of the physical actor in criminal theory. If we treat corporations, at 
least as a legal matter, as being capable of having mental culpability, we should 
also ask what their bodies are for the purpose of the actus reus dimension of 
criminality. Diamantis argues for the promise of a novel perspective on what 
parts and functions of the corporation might comprise the corporation’s “body,” 
that is, a theory allowing for the potential of imposing liability for the harmful 
results of a wider variety of corporate functions and processes. Diamantis 
observes that this discussion has been missing from the theory of corporate 
criminality: “Just as the law needs an account of how corporations think if they 
are to be held to account for crimes and torts, it also needs an account of how 
corporations can act.”19 
The literature on corporate crime is pervaded by efforts to apply and 
analogize individual criminal processes to the corporation. In Using the 
Corporate Prosecution and Sentencing Model for Individuals: The Case for a 
Unified Federal Approach,20 Rachel Barkow turns that perspective around, 
considering how treatment of corporations might apply to individuals. Barkow 
asks why corporations benefit from the individualized approach of negotiated 
enforcement and settlement, usually with attention to the details of a firm’s 
 
 15.  Nelson, supra note 3. 
 16.  John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 
(1926). 
 17.  Nelson, supra note 3, at 115. 
 18.  Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Body Corporate, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 133. 
 19.  Id. at 134. 
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business and its processes, while individuals are sentenced in federal court under 
a rigid grid-like structure. Both the DOJ and Sentencing Commission have taken 
a view that the most severe sentences should be imposed in individual cases, but 
in contrast, “they have recognized the costs of severity in the corporate realm.”21 
Indeed, beginning with the Holder Memo, the DOJ has developed detailed 
leniency-preferring guidelines for corporate cases. As Barkow observes, no such 
rules exist for individual charging decisions for the most part, and instead, the 
DOJ has often issued brief guidance that the most severe provable charges should 
be pursued against individuals. Sentencing guidelines, similarly, have often not 
taken into account potential rehabilitation or the relevance of a range of other 
individual characteristics. Thus, Barkow notes: “There is no reason to maintain a 
policy that sees the value in saving and recognizing the worth of companies, but 
ignores the value in saving and recognizing the worth of individuals.”22 
What might the next two decades bring for the field of corporate 
prosecutions? One common theme among these wonderful contributions is that 
the practice of corporate prosecutions needs a theory, and to some extent already 
has one. It should more consciously focus on the instrumental goals of detecting 
and preventing corporate misconduct, while clearing away many of the 
distracting old conversations about individual criminal law theory in the 
corporate context. 
In an even more developed and mature field of instrumental corporate 
enforcement, prosecutors would validate information-seeking and compliance 
approaches more rigorously and the field would be subject to more sophisticated 
assessment by academics for its broad social value in light of the still growing 
problem of corporate crime. In a future administration, DOJ might: consider 
relaxing its longstanding opposition to more judicial and other institutional 
supervision of, and involvement in, its administration of corporate settlements; 
pursue corporate investigations and prosecutions in a manner that makes data 
collection and analysis far more accessible; and continue to refine, based on 
available evidence, how monetary and other sanctions can be further calibrated 
and specified to produce optimal incentives for self-reporting, cooperation, and 
remediation. 
Meanwhile, it is time to apply lessons from the decades of modern corporate 
prosecution to the individual criminal setting, both within corporations and 
outside them. It is fair to expect that twenty years from now, the problem of 
corporate crime might be as settled as a matter of theory as the nature of basic 
individual criminality is now. Perhaps then there can be a full turn from 
theoretical first principles so that questions about how best to manage corporate 
prosecution and punishment become—as they have in recent years with 
prosecution of individuals for all types of crime—predominantly a matter of 
debating procedural justice and costs and benefits on the ground. 
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